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Abstract
We present a bargaining model of wage and employment determina-
tion, where we show that foreign acquisitions might hurt the bargaining
outcome of powerful unions by giving the firm a credible threat to move
production abroad. Using detailed data on firms and workers in manufac-
turing, including information on union membership and foreign ownership,
we find, in line with the predictions of our model, that foreign acquisitions
negatively impact the outcome of workers in highly unionized plants.
1 Introduction
Deepening economic integration with the rest of the world has been a central
trend for most countries over the last few decades. This has raised the debate
about whether globalization has caused disruptive effects in the labor markets
of developed countries.1 One broad strand of literature has investigated to what
extent increased globalization could affect the ability of labor unions to secure
beneficial outcomes for their members when negotiating with employers.2 One
important feature of the globalization process has been the rapid increase in
foreign direct investment (FDI), of which a large part has come in the form
of cross-border mergers and acquisitions. In this paper we investigate whether
foreign takeovers of domestic plants affect the ability of unions to capture their
share of firm rents.
We study how the development of wages in Norwegian manufacturing plants
acquired by foreign owners depend on union density at the plant level. We
1See Freeman (1995) for an early survey of some of this literature, and Harrison, McLaren,
and McMillan (2010) for an overview of more recent issues and findings.
2This strand of the literature takes as an implicit starting point that unions are able to
increase wages, and considers how this ability is affected by globalization. A large empirical
literature supports the notion that there is a general union wage premium, and the empirical
literature typically finds union wage premia of around 10%, see e.g., Blanchflower and Bryson
(2002) who reports estimated union wage premia for several countries. For a brief overview of
the issues involved in establishing a union wage premium, see Bryson (2007). See Card (1996)
for an analysis of how unions may affect wage structure. DiNardo and Lee (2004) question
the union-wage premium literature in terms of ability to identify causal effects.
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present a firm-level Nash bargaining model where we show that foreign acqui-
sition improves the outside option of the firm relative to the outside option of
the union. The effect is stronger when the bargaining power of the union in
the acquired plant is high. The model predicts that the change in bargaining
outcome for the union in the acquired plant is more negative if the plant has a
strong union, than if the union in the acquired plant has low bargaining power.
We test this empirical prediction using both plant- and worker level data from
Norwegian manufacturing for the period 1996–2007. Our findings are consistent
with the prediction that foreign acquisitions lead to larger negative changes in
the outcome for workers in plants where unions are strong.
In a general rent sharing framework where a labor union and a firm bargain
over the division of rents,3 globalization could change the bargaining outcome
for the union through three main channels. First, of most relevance to this
paper, globalization could change the bargaining outcome by affecting the out-
side options of the bargaining parties.4 If globalization improves the outside
option of the firm relative to the union, this will reduce the share of rents
that the union gets. One possibility is that the firm’s outside option could im-
prove after becoming part of a multinational firm, regardless of whether this is
a result of inward or outward FDI. The basic intuition is related to the pos-
sibility of reallocating production between plants that are located in different
countries—so-called “footloose” production (see, e.g., Choi, 2001; Lommerud,
Straume, and Sørgard, 2006; Clougherty, Gugler, Sorgard, and Szucs, 2014).5
Both Lommerud, Straume, and Sørgard (2006) and Clougherty, Gugler, Sor-
gard, and Szucs (2014) present theoretical bargaining models of cross-border
mergers where unions set wages and firms set employment. In both models
the international merger improves the outside option of the firm relative to the
union, and thus affects wages negatively.6 A further prediction from the model
in Clougherty, Gugler, Sorgard, and Szucs (2014), where a monopoly union sets
wages and the firm sets employment, is that mergers are more likely to decrease
wages under higher unionization rates. We get a similar prediction from our
model, using a bargaining framework. We assume that the firm and the union
simultaneously bargain over both wages and employment. Along similar lines,
Kramarz (2008) constructs a model where the possibility for the firm to offshore
part of its production acts as a threat point in the negotiations with the unions.
In addition, offshoring in this model also reduces the amount of rents that can
be shared between the firm and the union. Using French firm level data to test
his model, Kramarz finds that firms that had high rents and faced strong unions
at the time of the introduction of the single European market in the early 1990s
(which increased opportunities for offshoring) increased their offshoring, while
3Christofides and Oswald (1992) and Abowd and Lemieux (1993) are examples of studies
finding evidence consistent with the existence of rent sharing in firms.
4Outside options are sometimes referred to as threat points or fall-backs.
5Several studies find evidence that is consistent with a story of footloose production without
having explicit focus on unions and union bargaining power. Bernard and Jensen (2007) and
Gorg and Strobl (2003) find evidence of higher probability of exit for foreign owned plants in
the US and Ireland respectively. Fabbri, Haskel, and Slaughter (2003) find evidence of labor
demand elasticities being positively correlated with activity of multinational enterprises for
low-skilled manufacturing workers in the US and the UK.
6Choi (2001) also shows how an improvement in the outside option of the firm after FDI
has a negative impact on wages in a Nash bargaining framework, although he treats the change
in the outside option as exogenous.
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firms with weak unions did not. “As a result, in those firms where rents were
initially high, unions’ strength appears to have backfired” (Kramarz, 2008, p. 2).
Second, globalization could negatively affect the bargaining power of unions,
which we could think of as a shift in the parameter in Nash bargaining models
that captures relative bargaining power of the negotiation parties. One possible
reason for reduced bargaining power is a reduction in union membership. The
link between globalization and union membership in 17 OECD countries over
the period from 1980 to 1999 is investigated by Dreher and Gaston (2007). They
conclude that economic integration has no effect on unionization, while social
integration reduces unionization.7 Brock and Dobbelaere (2006) and Dumont,
Rayp, and Willem (2006) estimate bargaining power at the industry-year level,
and relate these estimates of bargaining power to different measures of globaliza-
tion at the industry level. The Nash bargaining framework conceptually makes
a clear distinction between bargaining power and outside options. However,
in reduced-form empirical work where wage equations are the main source of
identification, it is in general not possible to separately identify to what extent
changes in outcomes are a result of changes in bargaining power or changes in
threat points.
Third, globalization could reduce the rents to be shared between the firm
and the union, and thereby affect wages. The main channel for reduced rents
is increased import competition. Gaston and Trefler (1995) present a model of
union and firm wage bargaining where international competition reduces rents.
They empirically test the effect of import competition on the union wage pre-
mium using data for union workers in US manufacturing industries in 1983.
They find that union wage premia are negatively affected by import compe-
tition at the industry level. Similarly, Abowd and Lemieux (1993) find that
increased international competition through import price shocks was a source
for reduced rents in Canadian manufacturing industries during the period from
1964 to 1983.8
Our paper is partly related to the literature on whether foreign acquisitions
increase wages in acquired plants.9 This literature has pointed out the possibil-
ity that a foreign acquisition through, for instance, technology transfer has the
potential to increase productivity and wages in the acquired plant. As pointed
out by Clougherty, Gugler, Sorgard, and Szucs (2014), this literature has mostly
ignored the potentially opposing effect of the wage bargaining process. Regres-
sions of wages on foreign ownership change without also accounting for the
possibility of a negative bargaining effect will only capture the average effect.
This could explain the many studies finding no effect on wages of foreign acqui-
sitions. The reason could simply be that any potentially positive productivity
effects are cancelled out by negative bargaining effects in the aggregate.
Most of the previous empirical studies on the general link between global-
ization and union bargaining outcomes use industry level proxies for both union
7In the study of Dreher and Gaston (2007), economic integration is measured by an amal-
gam of separate indices for trade, foreign direct investments, and cross-border factor payments,
as well as restrictions on trade and capital flows. Social integration is meant to capture the
spread of ideas and information, and is proxied by measures on international tourism, internet
users, number of radios, and the number of McDonald’s restaurants located in a country.
8Bratsberg and Ragan (2002) find a positive effect of import competition at the industry
level and discuss why this could be the case.
9See for example, Heyman, Sjo¨holm, and Tingvall (2007) and Hijzen, Martins, Schank,
and Upward (2010) and references therein.
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bargaining power and globalization. For example, Abowd and Lemieux (1993);
Gaston and Trefler (1995); Bratsberg and Ragan (2002) analyse how indus-
try level imports or import competition affects unions. Brock and Dobbelaere
(2006); Dumont, Rayp, and Willem (2006) use measures of imports, foreign
direct investment activity and union bargaining power at the industry level in
their analyses of the link between union bargaining power and globalization.
Choi (2001) estimates industry level union wage premia, and relates these to
the industry level stock of outward FDI. Also Clougherty, Gugler, Sorgard, and
Szucs (2014) who empirically test a prediction that is similar to the prediction
that we test, have data on unionization and the extent of merger activity only
at the industry level. We contribute to the empirical literature by using plant
level data both for the foreign ownership status of plants, and for the share of
employees in the plant who are members of a trade union. By using the latter
as a proxy for the bargaining power of unions, we are able to conduct a more di-
rect test than Clougherty, Gugler, Sorgard, and Szucs (2014). We test whether
the change in bargaining outcome for the union in the acquired plant is more
negative if the plant has a strong union, than if the union in the acquired plant
has little bargaining power.10
Using detailed Norwegian manufacturing data and matched employer-employee
data, we conduct an empirical test of the main prediction from our model: that
workers in plants where unions are strong have more to lose from a foreign ac-
quisition, compared to workers in plants where unions are weak. In the model
we assume efficient bargaining to take place, but our main testable implication
is robust to other formulations of the bargaining process. Since our main pre-
diction is that the impact of foreign acquisitions on wages depends on union
bargaining power, we estimate wage regressions at both the plant and individ-
ual level, where the main variable of interest is an interaction term between a
dummy identifying the period after foreign acquisition and our variable for the
bargaining power of unions. Consistent with the predictions from the model, we
find that this interaction term is negative and significant, both in the economic
and statistical sense. These results are in line with the findings of Braun (2009),
who uses Danish data that is similar in detail to our Norwegian data. We differ
from his analysis by analyzing the effects of acquisitions both at the plant level
and at the worker level.
We further contribute to the literature by contrasting the effect in plants
that are acquired by foreign owners to what happens to wages in plants subject
to domestic ownership change. In the model, a prerequisite for an improvement
in the firm’s outside option after foreign acquisition is that the unions in the
domestic and foreign plants cannot coordinate.11 It is reasonable to assume that
in the case of a domestic merger, there is on average a larger extent of union
coordination when negotiating with the firm. This implies that the improvement
in the firm’s outside option after domestic ownership change should be smaller
than in the case of foreign ownership change. As a result, we should expect
less of a negative bargaining effect in highly unionized plants after a domestic
ownership change than after a foreign acquisition. Our results are consistent
10The main focus in Clougherty, Gugler, Sorgard, and Szucs (2014) is on the wage effects of
the domestic firms that are not subject to international merger activity, where they integrate
the negative bargaining effect and the positive FDI-spillover effect.
11This is in line with the assumption made in both Lommerud, Straume, and Sørgard (2006)
and Clougherty, Gugler, Sorgard, and Szucs (2014).
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with this argument.
In the next section we present our model. In Section 3, we describe the
construction of our dataset and provide descriptive statistics. In Section 4, we
briefly describe some institutional features of wage formation and the role of
unions in Norway, and present our empirical approach. We present the results
of our empirical analysis in Section 5, while we discuss our findings and conclude
in Section 6.
2 Model
To motivate the notion that a foreign acquisition could change the outcome of
wage bargaining at the firm level, we present a model of wage setting where the
firm has market power and workers are unionized. We assume efficient bargain-
ing where the firm and the union negotiate over both wages and employment,
extending a model setup similar to the one introduced by McDonald and Solow
(1981). We show that a foreign acquisition of the firm will lower union wages.
Our model is also related to the bilateral oligopoly model with bargaining of
Horn and Wolinsky (1988a), though we allow for bargaining over both price
(wage) and quantity (employment), as well as asymmetric bargaining power.
2.1 Before acquisition
If the firm and the union come to an agreement in the situation where the firm
consists only of a domestic plant, the firm gets pi = R(L) − wL and the union
gets U(w,L), where L is the amount of labor employed in the plant, w is the
wage rate, R(L) is revenue net of non-labor production costs, and U is the utility
function of the union. In the case of disagreement, the parties get their outside
options. For the firm, the outside option consists of a reservation profit pi, which
can be interpreted as the alternative cost of operating in agreement with the
union. In a short-term interpretation, the alternative cost could be the profit
from temporary arrangements that keep the business running during a strike,
while in a long-term interpretation, it could be the salvage value of capital bound
up in the plant. The outside option for the union consists of a reservation utility
u, which could be based on unemployment benefits or alternative employment.
Let the wage bargaining be approximated by a Nash bargaining model, where
β is the bargaining strength of the labor union, and 1 − β is the bargaining
strength of the firm. For simplicity, let the utility function of the union be given
by U = (w − w)L, where w is the reservation wage for each worker. The union
thus cares about the total wage payment net of the reservation wage for each
employed worker.12 Also, let u = 0 such that the reservation wage w captures
the outside option of the union. The bargaining objective, often called the Nash
product, can then be expressed as
O = β ln
(
(w − w)L)+ (1− β) ln (R(L)− wL− pi) . (1)
Assuming that the parties bargain over both employment and wages, the
resulting level of employment will implicitly be given by R′(L∗) = w. The level
12This formulation gives the strongly efficient bargaining solution directly. A formulation
where unions care about benefits to unemployed workers and wages to employed workers will
also give the strongly efficient solution.
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of employment L∗ is efficient, in the sense that it maximizes the total surplus
of the relationship between the union and the firm, where the surplus is given
by S(L) ≡ R(L)−wL− pi. The bargaining then simplifies to dividing the fixed
surplus S(L∗) by setting the wage. The resulting wage
w∗ = w + β
S(L∗)
L∗
, (2)
has the intuitive interpretation that as the labor union gets more bargaining
power, i.e., β increases, the wage moves from the reservation wage towards the
total surplus per worker in addition to the reservation wage. The resulting profit
for the firm is simply the firm’s reservation profit in addition to the remaining
surplus not appropriated by the union
pi∗ = pi + (1− β)S(L∗). (3)
The efficient bargaining protocol is chosen mostly for convenience. The strongly
efficient outcome allows us to abstract from inefficiencies arising when there is
a trade-off between employment and wages, such that we can focus on the
distributional effects in isolation.13 In addition, it also allows us to obtain
tractable analytical expressions without assuming particular functional forms
for production technology and product market effects.
2.2 After acquisition
We now move to the situation after a foreign acquisition. For simplicity, assume
that the firm post-acquisition consists of only two plants; one domestic (D)
and one foreign (F ). Let revenues in plant i ∈ {D,F} be given by Ri(L),
where L =
(
LD, LF
)
. We assume that there is substitutability between the
two plants in the sense that increased production in one plant lowers revenues
of the other, i.e., ∂Ri∂Lj
< 0 when j 6= i. This can for example be interpreted
as a product market externality through a price effect. Substitutability will,
under conditions which we return to below, give the firm a credible threat in
equilibrium by increasing the firm’s reservation profit.
The profit in each plant is given by pii = Ri(L)−wiLi. We assume that the
firm bargains over wage and employment in separate but simultaneous negoti-
ations with the union in each plant. Furthermore, we assume that the outcome
in each plant is the solution to a bilateral Nash bargaining problem, conditional
on the negotiated agreement in the other plant. This latter assumption leads
to what is often called the Nash-in-Nash bargaining solution, first proposed by
Horn and Wolinsky (1988a).14 In the following, we normalize the outside op-
tion before acquisition, pi, to zero in order to focus on the change in the outside
option arising due to the externality between the foreign and domestic plants
after foreign acquisition of the domestic plant.15 To keep in line with the focus
13See, e.g., McDonald and Solow (1981) for a treatment of the case with a single union and
a single employer, where the union controls wages and the employer controls employment, as
well the case of bargaining that does not necessarily lead to the strongly efficient solution.
14In our model, the Nash-in-Nash bargaining solution implies that the outcome—in terms
of wage and employment—is both a solution to the Nash bargaining problem in each plant, as
well as a Nash equilibrium to the game where independent pairs of players seek to maximize
the Nash product in each pairwise Nash bargaining game.
15This does not affect the results we want to highlight.
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on foreign acquisition of Norwegian manufacturing plants in our empirical anal-
ysis, the following exposition takes the perspective of the domestic plant that is
acquired from abroad.
After being acquired by foreign owners, the reservation profit of the firm in
the domestic plants now reflects the change in profit in the foreign plant when
there is no production, i.e., conflict, in the domestic plant. It is not obvious
how the profit in one plant should be determined when there is disagreement in
the other plant. We assume that in the case of a disagreement in a plant, the
workers there get their outside option and the firm gets zero in this particular
plant (pi = 0), while the workers in the other plant and the firm renegotiate their
contract. Since there is only one plant in operation, and thus no interaction
between plants, the outcome in this subgame will simply be given by Nash
bargaining between the firm and workers in the operational plant. Thus, in the
case of a breakdown of negotiations in the domestic plant, the resulting profit
in the foreign plant will be
pi0F = (1− βF )(RF (L0F , 0)− wFL0F ) = (1− βF )S0F , (4)
where βF is the bargaining power and wF is the reservation wage of workers in
the foreign plant. L0F is given by
∂RF
∂LF
(L0F , 0) = wF , i.e., the efficient level of
employment in the foreign plant when there is no production in the domestic
plant.16 The second equality is just a definition, where S0F denotes the maxi-
mized surplus in the foreign plant given LD = 0.
Denote by ∆piF the difference in profit from the foreign plant between the
case where all of the firms’ production occurs in the foreign plant, and the case
where production occurs in both plants, i.e., ∆piF ≡ pi0F − piF . We refer to
∆piF as the stand-alone profit difference of plant F . After foreign acquisition
of the domestic plant, ∆piF constitutes the outside option of the firm in the
negotiations with the union of the domestic plant.
The objective function for the Nash bargaining between the firm and workers
in the domestic plant is then
OD = βD ln
(
(wD − wD)LD
)
+ (1− βD) ln
(
RD(L)− wDLD −∆piF
)
, (5)
which is maximized with respect to wD and LD for the domestic plant. Together
with the equivalent maximization problem for the foreign plant solved for wF
and LF , this gives the level of employment L
∗ ≡ (L∗D, L∗F ), such that
∂RD
∂LD
∣∣∣∣∣
L=L∗
+
∂RF
∂LD
∣∣∣∣∣
L=L∗
= wD, (6)
with an equivalent condition for the foreign plant. This is the level of employ-
ment that maximizes total surplus of the plants,
∑
i∈{D,F}
(
Ri(L)− wiLi
)
.17
The resulting wage in the domestic plant is
w∗D = wD + βD
(
SD(L
∗)−∆pi∗F
L∗D
)
, (7)
16Another possibility is to assume simultaneous bargaining over contingent contracts in the
two plants. In this case, the pairwise bargains will be over one contract for the case of an
agreement, and one for the case of disagreement in the other plant. When each pair expect
that if they disagree, the other pair will maximize their Nash product, the same equilibrium
will arise.
17Note that ∂∆piF
∂L
D
= ∂RF
∂L
D
.
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where SD(L
∗) is the surplus generated in the domestic plant, RD(L∗)−wDL∗D,
and ∆pi∗F ≡ pi0F − pi∗F is the stand-alone profit difference for the foreign plant
evaluated at equilibrium bargaining profit.18
If the stand-alone profit difference for the foreign plant is positive in equi-
librium, the outside option of the firm when bargaining with the union in the
acquired domestic plant has improved relative to before the acquisition. From
inspection of Equation (7), we see that for given surplus and employment in
the domestic plant, an increase in the outside option through an increase in
the stand-alone profit difference for the foreign plant, will reduce wages in the
domestic plant. Since also employment and surplus in the domestic plant may
change after acquisition, wages may not necessarily be negatively affected. This
would be the case if there is a sufficiently large decrease in employment com-
pared to the increase in the outside option of the firm. However, seeing that
the relationship between the revenue functions of the plants plays a key role
in determining the stand-alone profit difference, it is likely that at least some
of the loss to the union will manifest itself through wages, as the opposite will
require quite peculiar curvature of these functions.
We now proceed to show formally that the stand-alone profit difference for
the foreign plant is positive in equilibrium under plausible conditions. Equilib-
rium bargaining profit in each of the plants is given by the equations
pi∗i = βi∆pi
∗
j + (1− βi)Si(L∗), i, j ∈ {D,F}, i 6= j. (8)
From the perspective of the domestic plant, equilibrium profit pi∗F in the foreign
plant has a negative effect on equilibrium profit in the domestic plant, as this
decreases the threat point ∆pi∗F of the firm when bargaining with the domestic
union.
To obtain an expression for the equilibrium stand-alone profit difference in
the foreign plant, subtract equilibrium profit for the foreign plant, as given by
Equation (8), from pi0F , as given by Equation (4). This yields
∆pi∗F = (1− βF )∆S∗F − βF∆pi∗D, (9)
where ∆S∗F ≡ S0F − SF (L∗) is the additional surplus created in the foreign
plant when there is no production in the domestic plant, compared to the case
where there is production in both plants. Note that ∆S∗i is guaranteed to be
positive in both plants, owing to the assumption that production in the plants
are substitutes. To see the intuition behind Equation (9), note that it describes
the threat point of the firm when bargaining with workers in the domestic plant.
On the one hand, if a larger part of the firm’s profit in the plant abroad is due to
plant surplus, this increases the firm’s threat point ∆pi∗F when bargaining with
the domestic union. In this case, the domestic plant is more dispensable, as the
firm can ensure a relatively high profit by producing exclusively in the plant
abroad. On the other hand, if more of the firm’s profit in the plant abroad
is due to the threat point generated by the domestic plant, ∆pi∗D, this lowers
∆pi∗F . The reason is that the domestic plant is less dispensable in this case, as
it contributes relatively more to the profit the firm gets abroad.
18Note that we keep the outside option of the firm separate from the plant surplus. This is
to clarify the strategic importance of the outside option.
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In equilibrium, the stand-alone profit difference in the foreign plant—and
thus the outside option of the firm when bargaining with the domestic workers—
is
∆pi∗F =
1
1− βDβF
(
(1− βF )∆S∗F − βF (1− βD)∆S∗D
)
. (10)
The profit difference in Equation 10 will be positive, as long as
∆S∗F
∆S∗D
> βF
1− βD
1− βF . (11)
In the symmetric case, that is, where plants are equal and the bargaining
power of workers is equal in both plants, it is clear that ∆pi∗i > 0 for both
the domestic plant and the plant abroad. Further, from the right hand side of
the expression, we can see that for a sufficiently low bargaining power of the
workers in the foreign plant, the condition will be satisfied, as the left hand side
is strictly positive. The same is true for a sufficiently high bargaining power of
the domestic workers. The power of unions is highly institutionalized in Norway,
also at the local level, which makes it plausible that the domestic workers will
have a high bargaining power compared to workers in other plants under the
firm’s control.
Without specifying further restrictions on Ri(L), it is not possible to make
any statements about the stand-alone surplus differences in general. However,
since the revenue substitution between plants can be interpreted as a product
market externality operating through prices; relative size and capacity would
appear to be reasonable determinants of the surplus difference. If a large pro-
ducer stops producing, it would plausibly have a larger impact on the prices of
a small producer than the reverse case. This would imply that the left hand
side is smaller when the foreign plant is larger than the domestic plant. Though
we have no way of actually checking this, we note that the acquired plants in
our sample are large, both in terms of the number of employees and production,
compared to the average Norwegian manufacturing plant, something we return
to later when we describe the data. This does not preclude large size differ-
ences between Norwegian plants and plants abroad, but we note that Equation
(11) will hold for sufficiently high domestic and/or sufficiently low foreign union
bargaining power.
The case where Equation (10) is negative would reflect large asymmetry
between the plants. If the workers in the foreign plant have very high, while
the domestic workers have very low bargaining power, the firm could have a
negative stand-alone profit difference for the foreign plant, ∆pi∗F . This is because
the firm would lose its outside option in the foreign plant, ∆pi∗D, in the case
of a disagreement with the domestic workers. Since our object of study is
the outcome of workers in Norwegian plants that are acquired from abroad,
and Norway has high union density compared to most countries, asymmetry in
bargaining power in favour of the foreign union seems unlikely to be important.
Even though the particular features of our model might seem restrictive,
the prediction of a negative bargaining effect proves quite robust to alternative
specifications. The same result has been shown by Lommerud, Straume, and
Sørgard (2006), studying a rights-to-manage setup where a monopoly union
sets wages and the firm sets employment. Horn and Wolinsky (1988b) show
how a negative bargaining effect arises when the firm decides employment, but
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bargains over wages with two separate groups of workers.19
3 Data sources and descriptives
In our analysis we use several annual data bases for the years 1996–2007. All
of these data bases are censuses that can be linked together through firm or
plant identifiers. All data sources are administered by Statistics Norway. One
of the sources is the Norwegian Manufacturing Statistics, which is collected at
the plant level. We keep only plants that are observed consecutively for at least
three years during 1996–2007, and that do not have any gaps in their time series.
We then drop very small plants, defined as plants with on average less than 3
employees every year or with average production value or total wage costs of
less than one million NOK per year. The manufacturing statistics provides
information about the value of output and input use, employment, wage costs
and NACE industry classification.
We also utilize the SIFON register, which is a register of foreign ownership
interests in Norwegian firms. SIFON provides information about shares of firm
assets/stocks that are owned by foreign owners. With the information in the
SIFON register, we define a plant as foreign owned if the foreign ownership share
is above 50%.20 Our definition of a foreign acquisition occurring in year t is thus
that the foreign ownership share is above 50% in year t, but was below 50% in
year t−1. This definition of foreign acquisition corresponds to the discussion of
foreign acquisitions in our model. It should be noted that the acquisition event
itself is quite abrupt in most cases, where the foreign ownership share jumps
from well below 50% to well above from one year to the next. We drop plants
with more than one foreign acquisition during our sample period.
As a robustness check on our results we also include in some of our regressions
a dummy variable to indicate when a plant changes owner from one domestic
owner to a new domestic owner. Our definition of domestic ownership change
makes use of the plant and firm identifiers in the manufacturing statistics. While
the plant identifiers are connected to a specific location with production in a
specific industry, the firm identifier is related to the legal owner (firm). The
plant identifier does not change as long as the production is within the same
industry and in the same location, while the firm identifier may change if the
plant gets a new owner. Thus we identify a domestic ownership change for a
plant in year t if the plant does not have the same firm identifier in year t and
year t− 1. We also require that the new firm id in year t owned other plants in
t− 1. Further, the plant must not ever be defined as foreign owned.21
We construct capital data at the plant level by using a database from Statis-
tics Norway with capital values of manufacturing firms constructed from ac-
counting data (see Raknerud, Rønning, and Skjerpen, 2004). Since the capital
values in this database are at the firm level, we distribute capital values to the
plants of multi-plant firms by using production-value and employment shares.
19Though their setting is not one of foreign acquisitions, their framework easily lends itself
to such an interpretation.
20The SIFON register records both direct and indirect foreign ownership shares. We do not
make a distinction between direct and indirect foreign ownership in our analysis, but define
a plant as foreign owned if either the direct or the indirect foreign ownership share exceeds
50%.
21We drop plants with more than one ownership change from our analysis.
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We drop plants with missing, zero or negative capital values. The variable
for capital input we use in our regressions is the user cost of capital. This is
calculated as the full rental value of all equipment and buildings employed by
the firm. This includes the expenses for rented buildings and equipment and
the rental value of buildings and equipment owned by the firm. The assumed
time cost for calculation of rental value of owned capital is the sum of 10-year
bond rates as reported by the central bank of Norway and depreciation rates
for buildings and equipment separately. Both rental expenses and calculated
rental value for owned capital are deflated by the price index for buildings and
equipment separately. With the exception of the 10-year bond rates, all figures
going into this calculation are from the capital database of Statistics Norway
(Raknerud, Rønning, and Skjerpen, 2004).
We then link the income tax files to the manufacturing plant panel using the
plant identifiers. The income tax files contain information about workers and the
periods they are employed by a given employer and the associated earnings over
the course of this employment period or job-spell. We also use the employer-
employee data for the whole population to get information about age, gender
and education of the individuals that have job spells in manufacturing plants.
Based on these matches, we drop plants that have one or more years without
matched workers. Also, from the income tax files, we have information about
claimed tax deductions for union membership, we use this as our indicator of
union membership. We define a worker as a union members if the income tax
files show that the paid union membership fee in a given year is above NOK
100.
With the workers and job spells we have linked to manufacturing plants at
this stage, we construct plant level variables for employment and skill-shares of
the work force. In doing this we record the number of workers employed by the
plant at three dates for each year (10th of February, June and October), and
construct a measure of the number of employees and skill shares as the average
over these dates for each year. Workers recorded working part time are given a
lower weight than fulltime workers.22
The final part of our cleaning procedures is related to the information in
the job spell data. We drop job spells that last less than two years, and job
spells where the worker each year works less than 90 days in the plant (we think
of these as typical summer-jobs). We also drop workers who do not work full-
time all years when they are in manufacturing plants. Based on the data on
earnings during the job-spell and information about start and stop dates of the
spell, we calculate our wage measure as the daily wage during the job spell in a
given year. Workers that always earn less than 350 NOK per day are dropped
from our sample.23 Our resulting plant-panel contains about 58,000 plant-year
observations from almost 6,500 different plants for the period from 1996 to 2007.
These plants employ in total over the period 250,000 different workers giving
rise to 1.6 million worker-year observations.
22The data contains a categorical variable for expected weekly work hours. Workers recorded
as working 30 hours or more per week, are given the weight of 1 in the calculations of skill
shares and number of employees. Job spells with work hours between 20 and 30 hours are
given a weight of 0.65, while shorter work hours are given a weight of 0.3.
23This is based on the earnings deflated by the consumer price index, and represents a daily
wage that would be well below the expected average daily wage for a fulltime manufacturing
worker in Norway.
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Table 1: Plants and workers involved in ownership change by year
Acquisitions
Foreign Domestic All plants
Year Plants Empl. Avg. Plants Empl. Avg. Plants Empl. Avg.
1996 . . . . . . 4,212 160,102 38
1997 18 1,189 66 6 200 33 4,553 170,287 37
1998 13 1,131 87 8 139 17 4,787 178,673 37
1999 38 3,397 89 16 972 61 4,777 177,135 37
2000 39 3,265 84 11 847 77 4,883 180,000 37
2001 24 3,015 126 26 2,603 100 4,891 177,467 36
2002 29 1,322 46 13 695 53 5,049 176,896 35
2003 25 700 28 10 810 81 5,083 167,781 33
2004 18 1,274 71 8 385 48 5,135 161,217 31
2005 28 2,533 90 12 430 36 5,135 162,398 32
2006 86 7,044 82 17 503 30 5,014 167,192 33
2007 54 4,296 80 6 149 25 4,359 136,814 31
Total 372 29,166 78 133 7,733 58 . . .
Note: This table shows the number of plants, employees (Empl.), and the average
number of employees per plant (Avg.) in our sample that are involved in an ownership
change in each year, as well as the same figures for all plants in our sample. Totals
calculated over ownership changes.
In Table 1 we show the number of plants, number of employees, and aver-
age employment for the plants becoming foreign owned and changing domestic
owners in each year, as well as the same figures for all plants in the sample. The
share of plants that are foreign owned increase from 4.5% in 1996 to just above
9% in 2007, the corresponding change in the foreign employment share is from
a share of 14% in 1996 to 27% in 2007. We are not able to identify more than
133 domestic to domestic ownership changes during our sample period, while
we have a total of 372 foreign acquisitions in our data.
Descriptive statistics for plant and individual level variables are shown in
Tables 2 and 3 respectively. We see that foreign owned plants are much larger on
average than the average in the population of plants. The foreign owned plants
also have higher average wages, and are noticeably more unionized. Conditional
on being foreign owned, i.e., having above 50% foreign ownership share, it is
apparent that most plants are completely foreign owned, considering the average
foreign ownership share of 97% in this group.
In our data for the manufacturing sector, the share of workers that are
members of a union is relatively stable at around 60% each year, with a slightly
falling trend. The share of workers that are members of a union, the union share,
varies between industries and also between plants within industries. Figure 1
shows union shares at the plant level for the NACE 2-digit industry with the
highest (Figure 1a) and lowest (Figure 1b) average union share over the whole
sample.24 The figure displays the overall union share in our sample together
24The average union shares at the 2 digit industry level were calculated only for industries
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Table 2: Plant level descriptives
All Foreign owned
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Mean (Std. Dev.)
Average wage 286.78 (156.49) 358.66 (284.59)
Employees 34.83 (84.91) 99.75 (145.37)
Union share 0.35 (0.34) 0.6 (0.30)
Foreign owned 0.07 (0.25) 1.00 (0.00)
Share high skilled 0.12 (0.16) 0.2 (0.20)
Share medium skilled 0.58 (0.20) 0.53 (0.17)
Share female 0.23 (0.21) 0.23 (0.18)
Foreign share 0.08 (0.25) 0.97 (0.11)
Capital user cost 4,017 (19,887) 15,819 (42,171)
Intermediates 42,978 (210,452) 172,908 (633,642)
N 57,878 3,834
Note: Monetary sizes in 1000 NOK (1998 base year).
Table 3: Individual descriptives
All Stayers
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Mean (Std. Dev.)
Daily wage 826.39 (335.06) 838.61 (305.75)
Union member 0.63 (0.48) 0.79 (0.41)
High skilled 0.15 (0.35) 0.12 (0.33)
Medium skilled 0.58 (0.49) 0.59 (0.49)
Age 40.91 (11.51) 43.23 (10.43)
Tenure 8.26 (6.63) 10.91 (6.48)
Foreign owned 0.20 (0.40) 0.53 (0.50)
Domestic owned 0.01 (0.11) 0.11 (0.32)
N 1,409,855 73,550
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Figure 1: Within-industry distribution of plant-level union shares
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Figure 2: Variation in plant level union shares
with the 1st, 2nd (Median) and 3rd quartiles in terms of plant level union shares
for each of these two industries. In the metal industry the median plant has a
union share of about 80%, while in the textile industry the median plant has a
union share varying around 20%.
In our empirical set-up, we use plant-level union shares as a proxy for the
bargaining power of unions. In order to identify a bargaining effect of unions,
we need variation not only within industries, but also within plants. The overall
variation in plant-level union shares is displayed in Figure 2a, while Figure 2b
depicts a histogram of the within-plant variation in union shares.
We estimate the size of the union wage premium in our data by regressing
the plant-level average wage on the plant-level union share and then step-by-
step adding further plant controls and fixed effects. The results are reported in
Table 4. After controlling for plant-level input use, skill shares and a full set of
industry-year interaction dummies, there is still an average union wage premium
of about 6.7%. Other things equal, the interpretation of the coefficient is that
plant-level average wages increase by almost 0.7% when the plant level union
density increases with 10 percentage points. Our estimate is a plant-level union
density effect, and our estimate is similar to that found by Barth, Raaum, and
having more than 500 plant-year observations in our 12-year sample.
14
Table 4: Union premium
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Wage premium 0.086∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Controls:
Industry-year No Yes Yes Yes
Production factors No No Yes Yes
Skill composition No No No Yes
Observations 52763 52763 52763 52763
R2 0.007 0.267 0.510 0.527
Standard errors in parentheses, clustering by plant
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: Based on regression of log of average wage in plant on union share.
Industry-year includes dummies for industry, year and their interaction, Pro-
duction factors include log of employees, log of capital and log of intermediates,
and Skill composition includes share of high and medium skilled workers. Plants
that are subject to an ownership change during the sample period are excluded
(5 115 observations).
Naylor (2000) using Norwegian survey data on union membership from 1989.
Barth, Raaum, and Naylor (2000) find that the wage premium from individual
union membership is very similar to that of the union wage premium stemming
from the plant level union share, and that the effect of individual membership
disappears when plant-level union density is controlled for. Their interpretation
is that the bargained wage at the plant level is a public good, which is increasing
in union density. Such an interpretation is implicit in our model as well.
The evidence in Table 4 is consistent with the expectation that unions in-
crease wages. This estimate is potentially biased upwards because a plant-level
regression does not take into account the possible selection of high quality work-
ers into plants with high union density. The estimated union wage premium
reported in Table 4 is also of an order of magnitude that is consistent with
previously reported union wage premia for Norway in Blanchflower and Bryson
(2002, p. 19), where they report an average union wage premium for Norway of
8%.
4 Empirical approach
In Norway, unions play an important role in the labor market, which together
with the institutional features governing wage formation make us think that a
bargaining model is appropriate for interpreting the outcomes observed in the
data. The share of employees who are members of a union, i.e., the union density,
is above 50% for the private sector as a whole, while the share is around 60% for
manufacturing (Stokke, Evju, and Frøland, 2003). Bargaining coverage is higher
than union density, because firms covered by a collective agreement follow the
agreement for all employees. Thus, in the private sector overall, about half of the
labor force is covered by collective agreements. However, in contrast to many
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Figure 3: Decomposition of nominal wage growth in manufacturing
Note: Data for these figures were collected by the authors from annual reports by The
Norwegian Technical Calculation Committee for Wage Settlements.
other European countries, extension mechanisms, i.e., imposing regulations from
collective agreements onto the non-unionized sectors, are not used in Norway.25
Our bargaining model captures the effect of local bargaining at the firm
level. Therefore, the possible mechanism we are trying to identify relies on firm
level adjustments on top of the centrally negotiated wages. Although collective
agreements are important in Norway, this does not preclude local bargaining
taking place at the firm level. Several facts support the argument that a model
of firm level bargaining is relevant in the Norwegian case. White-collar wages
are mainly set at the firm level, while the wages of blue-collar workers covered
by collective agreements are determined both by central and local negotiations.
The central negotiations, which take place at the national, and in some cases the
industry level, concern collective agreements, wage regulations, working hours,
working conditions, pensions, medical benefits, and in addition a negotiated
minimum wage.26 Local negotiations usually take place at the level of the
firm, and determine possible local adjustments and additions to the collective
agreements. Since the 1980s, there has been an increase in the share of firms
that are involved in local bargaining on top of the centrally negotiated wage.
Bryson and Dale-Olsen (2008) report that 70% of workplaces in Norway engaged
in local bargaining in 2003.
Figure 3 provides a decomposition of the wage growth of both blue- and
white-collar workers.27 The centrally negotiated outcome in terms of nominal
wage growth is denoted by Collective Agreement Wage Increase, while Wage
25For discussions of the Norwegian bargaining system, see, e.g., Barth, Raaum, and Naylor
(2000), Stokke, Evju, and Frøland (2003) and Bryson and Dale-Olsen (2008).
26There is no national, statutory minimum wage covering all workers in Norway. Minimum
wages only apply to workers covered by collective agreements.
27The Norwegian Technical Calculation Committee for Wage Settlements (in Norwegian:
Teknisk beregningsutvalg (TBU)) is a committee appointed by the government, and has as its
task to provide information about the general economic situation and the development of wages
to the bargaining parties in the collective bargaining processes. The motivation for such a fact-
finding committee is to “present the best possible background figures in a form that, as far as
possible, helps to avoid disagreement arising between the parties”. (http://www.regjeringen.
no/en/dep/asd/topics/labour-market-policy/income-policy/tbu.html?id=439434).
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Drift is the overall impact of wage increases that are not part of the collective
agreements. This includes local agreements within a firm or for a group of
employees within a firm, as well as individual salary raises. The term Wage
Carry-Over denotes the growth in wages from last year that would arise without
any further collectively negotiated increases or wage drift. This is a technical
accounting feature, which arises because wage settlements happens during the
calendar year, while wage growth is measured on a calendar year basis. The
figure clearly shows that firm level wage adjustments each year accounts for a
large share of total nominal wage increases. Even for blue-collar workers, Wage
Drift constitutes a larger part of wage growth than Collective Agreement Wage
Increase for many of the years in our sample.
The model presented in Section 2 contrasts the wage outcome when the firm
is a domestic entity to the wage outcome when the firm is acquired from abroad.
After the foreign acquisition, the firm becomes part of a multinational enterprise
with plants both in the domestic country (the home of the acquired plant) and
abroad. Under plausible conditions, a foreign acquisition improves the outside
option of the firm in its negotiations with the union in the domestic plant. The
reason is that in the case of conflict with the union in the domestic plant, the
firm’s outside option now includes the possibility of increasing production in
the plant it owns abroad. The key intuition and implication of our model is
the following: In the situation before acquisition, if the bargaining power of the
union is high, the firm will be forced to accept an outcome close to its outside
option. On the other hand, if the bargaining power of the union is low, the
wage will be close to the outside option of the workers. An improvement in
the firm’s outside option following foreign acquisition, will then have a larger
impact on the bargaining outcome when the union’s bargaining power is high.
Thus, the main result from the model is that the negative bargaining effect on
wages after foreign acquisition is strongest in plants where the bargaining power
of the union is large. This is the testable implication from our model that we
take to the data.
One challenge for the empirical test of the model’s main prediction is the
inherently unobserved nature of union bargaining power. Most previous stud-
ies have only used industry level measures of bargaining power, while our data
enables us to observe this at the plant level. Our proposal is to proxy union
bargaining power by union density or union share at the plant level, measured
by the share of employees who are union members. Barth, Raaum, and Naylor
(2000) argue that industrial action from the worker side in the event of disagree-
ment with the employer, will be more effective when plant level union density
is high.
Since our main prediction is that the impact of foreign acquisitions on wages
depends on union bargaining power, we estimate wage regressions of the follow-
ing type
lnwjt = δffjt + µujt + γfjt · ujt + β′xjt + εjt, (12)
where lnwjt is the (natural) log of the wage level in plant j in year t, where the
wage level is defined as wage averaged over the workers in the plant, fjt is an
indicator that takes the value one if plant j has a foreign ownership share larger
than 50% in year t and ujt is our measure of union bargaining power given by
the union share at the plant level. Our main interest lies in the coefficient on
the interaction term between the dummy for foreign ownership and the union
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share fjt · ujt. The prediction from the model is that the coefficient on this
term is negative. xjt is a vector of plant and industry controls, which includes
plant level inputs (log of capital, log of employees, log of intermediate usage),
the skill composition in the plant (the share of high skilled and medium skilled
workers), and a set of dummies for NACE 2-digit industry, year, and industry-
year interaction terms. Our main specifications include plant fixed effects, thus
the coefficient on foreign ownership and the interaction term of interest will be
identified by plants that change ownership from domestic to foreign, thus closely
representing the foreign acquisitions discussed in the model.
In our model, the overall loss to the domestic union from the foreign ac-
quisition of the plant, stems from the inability to coordinate with the union in
the foreign plant. If the same union bargains on behalf of both plants, there
would be no changes in the outside option of the firm following the foreign
acquisition of the domestic plant. Thus, if union coordination across the two
plants is possible, the negative bargaining effect in our model will disappear.
We conjecture that in the case of a merger with a domestic owner, there will on
average be a larger element of union coordination involved than in the case of
a foreign acquisition. Since we are able to identify domestic-to-domestic own-
ership changes, we utilize this conjecture to test the robustness of the model’s
predictions. We do this by including a dummy variable that identifies plants
that are acquired by new domestic owners and the interaction term between this
variable and union share. In cases where unions do not manage to coordinate
across domestic plants at all, the effect should be the same as for foreign ac-
quisitions. In cases where they have perfect coordination, the effect might even
be positive, if the domestic ownership change is correlated with positive prod-
uct market externalities or productivity gains.28 It is difficult to have a strong
prior on the distribution of these cases, and it is beyond the scope of this paper
to attempt to disentangle them. Our expectation is thus that the coefficient
on the interaction term between domestic ownership changes and unionization
should be less negative, than the interaction term between foreign acquisitions
and union share.
A limitation of the plant-level wage equation specified in Equation (12) is
that we do not take fully into account possible changes in the composition of
workers in the plant following ownership change. Such changes could affect
the impacts we see on average wages at the plant level. We therefore use our
rich matched employer-employee data to estimate wage equations also at the
individual level.
The reduced form approach we use does not allow us to separately identify
the effect on wages or employment without additional exclusion restrictions. We
estimate a log-linear version of Equation (7), which by itself can be interpreted
as an equation in the size of the wage bill. To get separate identification, we
would need to simultaneously estimate a labor-demand equation, which neces-
sitates exclusion restrictions for identification.29 Note that this is an inherent
problem in all empirical analysis involving prices and quantities, e.g., wages and
employment, and is not unique to our setting. Since our main interest lies in the
possibly of heterogenous impact of foreign ownership on the distribution of firm
28For a treatment of mergers when there are differences in the scope of union coordination
and product market externalities, see Lommerud, Straume, and Sørgard (2005).
29In our model, the effects are separated by the labor demand schedule given by Equation
(6).
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surplus, this is not necessarily a weakness in itself, but should be kept in mind
when interpreting the results. It is possible to interpret a negative interaction
between foreign ownership and unionization as an effect on wages specifically,
but this implies the exclusion restriction that employment would be unchanged
under foreign ownership if wages were held constant, i.e., a strong assumption
in lack of data.
5 Results
The main effect we test is the differential impact of foreign acquisitions on wages
depending on the bargaining power of unions at the plant level, as illustrated
in our model in Section 2. The argument is that strong unions that initially
have managed to capture a large share of the rents in their negotiations with
the firms, have more to lose from being taken over by foreign owners. The re-
sults from fitting Equation (12) with plant fixed effects included are reported
in Column (1) of Table 5. The coefficient on the interaction term in the fixed
effects specification implies that becoming foreign owned is associated with a
reduction in wages of roughly 7% in plants where all workers are unionized.
In itself, becoming foreign owned is associated with an increase in wages of
roughly 4%. The joint distribution of the estimated coefficients on foreign own-
ership and its interaction with union share, i.e., δ̂f and γ̂, is such that the joint
impact is significantly negative (in a statistical sense) for plants with roughly
80% unionization and above, while it is significantly positive for plants with
unionization below approximately 20%. To get a sense of the size of this effect,
we do a back-of-the-envelope calculation of the total effect of foreign ownership
for the average worker in the plants that become foreign acquired in the sample
period. We sum the implied change in total annual wage bill over all plants
j that become foreign owned in the year t they become foreign owned, more
precisely,
∑
j
∑
t 1
{
fjt = 1 ∧ fjt−1 = 0
}
wjtLjt · (δf + γujt), and divide by the
number of employees in the same set, i.e.,
∑
j
∑
t 1
{
fjt = 1 ∧ fjt−1 = 0
}
Ljt.
This yields an implied decrease in wage of about 4,400 NOK for the average
employee, which is approximately 1.2% of the average wage in foreign owned
plants overall. The OLS results for the same model, i.e., omitting plant fixed
effects, are shown in Column (4). The difference between the OLS and fixed
effects estimates points to a strong selection in which plants become foreign
owned. Plants with higher than average wages are more likely to become for-
eign owned, and also tend, to some extent, to be more unionized. Selection
effects makes the interaction term difficult to interpret in the OLS estimates,
as it depends on how foreign owned plants with high union share compare on
average to both the average foreign owned plants with low unionization, and
the average of plants with more unionization that are not foreign owned.
Columns (2) and (5) of Table 5 show estimates where the interaction term
between foreign ownership and union share is omitted for plant fixed effects and
OLS, respectively. This has important consequences for the estimated coefficient
on foreign ownership, where it decreases substantially in both specifications, and
disappears in the fixed effects estimates. The difference between OLS and fixed
effects estimates in this case is in line with previous studies on foreign ownership
and wages.30 Omitting also union share in Columns (3) and (6) of Table 5 leaves
30See, e.g., Heyman, Sjo¨holm, and Tingvall (2007), who show a similar result going from
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the estimates on the foreign dummy virtually unchanged from Columns (2) and
(5), respectively. Thus, adding the interaction term makes it apparent that there
is sizable heterogeneity in the foreign ownership impact according to plant level
unionization.
Table 5: Wage regression, log wagecost per employee as dependent variable
FE OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Foreign * Union -0.067∗∗ -0.118∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.014)
Foreign 0.037∗ -0.002 -0.002 0.128∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005)
Union 0.023∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004)
Share high skill 0.062∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.376∗∗∗ 0.379∗∗∗ 0.380∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Share med. skill 0.064∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Log employees -0.278∗∗∗ -0.278∗∗∗ -0.277∗∗∗ -0.154∗∗∗ -0.156∗∗∗ -0.151∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Log capital 0.048∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log intermediate 0.131∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 57,878
R2 0.418 0.418 0.418 0.454 0.454 0.453
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Controls: dummies for year, industry and industry-year, dummy for less than 10 employees, dummies
for large changes in wage, employment and capital
In the model, the negative bargaining effect on wages is a result of the domes-
tic workers indirectly competing with the workers abroad; the threat of moving
production abroad lurking in the background. The firm’s fallback improves
more, the more bargaining power the domestic workers have in comparison to
the workers abroad. In addition, the lack of union coordination across borders
contributes to this. As discussed in Section 2, the improvement in outside op-
tion for the firm is expected to be smaller in the case of a plant being taken
over by another domestic firm. Thus, in the case of ownership changing to
new domestic owners, we do not expect the same negative bargaining effect for
plants with high union shares. To test this, we estimate the model from Column
(1) of Table 5, this time including a dummy variable taking the value one in
OLS estimates of firm level wages, to estimates of individual wages using fixed effects for
individuals and firms.
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the period after domestic ownership change, and an interaction term between
the domestic ownership change dummy and union share. The result on the
coefficients of interest are reported in Column (1) of Table 6. The inclusion of
these two variables does not change the coefficients on the foreign ownership
variables, while the variables for domestic ownership change and its interaction
with union share are both insignificant. This makes us more confident that the
effect we find for foreign acquisitions is related to the increase in fallback fol-
lowing ownership change that is specific to foreign acquisitions, and not a result
of ownership change in general.
Table 6: Wage regression with domestic ownership changes, log wagecost per em-
ployee as dependent variable
Union share High union Union pre
Foreign * Union -0.067∗∗ -0.033∗ -0.039∗
(0.021) (0.016) (0.016)
Domestic * Union -0.012 0.003 0.003
(0.037) (0.026) (0.026)
Foreign 0.037∗ 0.017 0.021
(0.015) (0.012) (0.012)
Domestic -0.036 -0.044∗ -0.044∗
(0.023) (0.018) (0.018)
Union 0.023∗∗ . .
(0.007) . .
Observations 57,878
R2 0.419 0.418 0.418
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Controls: log employees, log capital, log intermediates, skill shares,
dummies for year, industry and industry-year, dummy for small firm,
dummies for large changes in wage, employment and capital
The interpretation of the results in Column (1) of Table 6 is that for plants
where all workers are union members, a foreign acquisition is associated with
an effect that in sum is negative on wages, while in plants with a union share of
zero, the wage effect of foreign acquisition is positive and in the order of 3.7%.
Since union share is a variable that also varies over time within plants, this is
a simplified interpretation of our results. It could be possible that the negative
coefficient on the interaction term is generated by a significant decline in union
share in foreign acquired plants. This would be in line with the argument by
Dreher and Gaston (2007) that globalization could reduce union membership.
In order to exclude the possibility that foreign acquisitions cause a reduction in
the union share, we estimate the change in union share on dummies for years
around foreign acquisition. The results are displayed in Figure 4 where we plot
the estimated coefficients on the dummies for years around foreign acquisition.
Figure 4 shows the estimated change in union share before and after foreign
acquisitions, displayed separately for plants above (High unionization) and be-
low (Low unionization) 60% union share. There is no evidence that changes in
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Figure 4: Change in plant level unionization before and after foreign ownership
change
Note: The plants are divided according to whether they have above or below 60%
unionization on average in the sample. The figures show estimated coefficients for
leads and lags of a dummy taking the value one in the year of foreign acquisition.
Fixed effects for plant, year, industry and industry-year are included as controls. 95%
confidence intervals for the estimated coefficients are indicated by the error bars.
union share are related to foreign acquisition for plants with high unionization.
For plants with low unionization, there does seem to be a weak, positive trend in
unionization, which continues from before the acquisition. However, the trend
becomes less pronounced if we control for the size of plants in terms of the user
cost of capital and the number of employees. This makes us believe that this
trend is driven by growth in this group of plants more than anything else.
To ease the interpretation of the interaction terms in the first column of Table
6, we replace the continuous variable for union share with a dummy variable
indicating whether the plant has a high union share. In the second column
of Table 6 we define the high union dummy based on the average union share
over time for each plant, and define plants as high union share plants if their
average union share is above 60%. To assess the concern that our results are
driven by changes in unionization brought about by foreign acquisition, we also
define another dichotomous measure of high unionization, based on the average
union share in the plant before acquisition being above 60%. The results using
this measure are shown in the last column (Union pre) of Table 6. These two
indicator measures both yield the result that there is a large and significant
negative association between foreign ownership and wages when workers are
highly unionized, and the results are basically unchanged between defining high
unionization based on the average over the whole sample, or just the period
before acquisition. All of the specifications in Table 6 are estimated with plant
fixed effects included, which is why the union measure cannot be separately
identified from the plant fixed effect in the two last columns, as the union
measures in these columns are constant within plants. Wages in plants subject
to domestic acquisition seem to decline after ownership change, though there is
no indication that this effect depends on the union share of the plant.
A limitation of the plant-level wage regressions done so far is that it is not
possible to assess how the effect arises. It could be driven both by changes in
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Table 7: Wage regression, log daywage as dependent variable
Union share High union
All Stayers All Stayers
FE OLS FE OLS FE FE
For. * Un. 0.004 -0.076∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗ -0.084∗∗ -0.024∗∗ -0.029∗∗
(0.015) (0.013) (0.022) (0.027) (0.009) (0.011)
Dom. * Un. 0.057 0.003 -0.080 -0.128∗∗ 0.019 -0.046
(0.047) (0.032) (0.057) (0.042) (0.024) (0.031)
Foreign 0.000 0.086∗∗∗ 0.024 0.035 0.023∗∗ 0.006
(0.011) (0.010) (0.016) (0.021) (0.008) (0.010)
Domestic -0.067∗ -0.026 -0.008 0.023 -0.044∗ -0.022
(0.028) (0.021) (0.036) (0.029) (0.017) (0.022)
Union -0.000 -0.081∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗ 0.012 . .
(0.006) (0.004) (0.046) (0.023) . .
Observations 1,409,855 73,550 1,409,855 73,550
R2 0.117 0.328 0.216 0.357 0.117 0.215
Standard errors in parentheses. Clustered by plant-year.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Controls: quadratic tenure and age, plant log capital, log employees, log intermediates, female
share and skill shares, dummies for year, industry and industry-year.
wages of workers already employed, or by changes in the composition of the
workers within a plant following an acquisition. Our model, and indeed other
models that have pointed out the possibility of a negative bargaining effect
after foreign acquisition, is too stylized to have any predictions on the exact
mechanism. One worry when interpreting the results as a bargaining effect, is
that changes in the composition of workers might be driven by efficient restruc-
turing of the firm’s operations after acquisition more than anything else. We
investigate this possibility by estimating our wage equations at the individual
level. Including both observable controls for individual and plant characteris-
tics as well as our variables of interest: the plant level union share and foreign
ownership change.
In order to control for both individual and plant unobserved fixed effects, we
estimate these wage regressions using spell fixed effects. Results are reported
in Table 7, where we use both the whole sample of matched job-spells to our
plant sample (All), and only spells that lasted from at least two years before
an acquisition to at least two years after (Stayers).31 The main specification
includes using spell fixed effects (FE ), while OLS estimates are provided for
reference. The results in the third column of Table 7 show that individuals who
are present in the firm at least two years before and after acquisition experience
a reduction in wages if they work in a highly unionized plant, which is evidence
that compositional changes does not drive the whole effect we find in the aggre-
31This sample restriction reduces the amount of observations dramatically, as we drop both
spells where an acquisition does not occur, as well as spells that start or end too close to the
acquisition.
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gate data. For the full sample of workers, identification of the effect of foreign
ownership and its interaction with union share will be provided by employees
who either start shortly before or leave shortly after an acquisition, in addition
to the stayers. As the results in the first column of Table 7 show, we do not
find any significant effect of acquisitions for this group, with the exception of
a negative association between wages and domestic acquisitions unrelated to
unionization. This indicates that the compositional effect from people leaving
shortly after or starting shortly before foreign acquisition offset the effect on the
stayers. This implies that the negative effect we find in the aggregate data to
some extent also reflects the effect of employees leaving before or starting after
the acquisition, e.g., employees with higher salaries quitting or new hires having
lower salaries, compared to the pre-acquisition average.
In the last two columns of Table 7, we change our measure of unionization
to an indicator of plant level unionization averaged over the sample period
being above 60%, which is the same alternative measure as previously discussed
and used in the second column of Table 6. We still find a significant negative
association between foreign ownership and wages in more unionized plants for
the stayers, as displayed in the last column of Table 7, though the effect is now
also estimated to be negative and significant for the group of all employees, as
shown in the next to last column of Table 7. The most probable explanation
for this discrepancy between the results when using plant level union share and
using the dichotomous union measure, is the presence of non-linearities in the
interaction effect which is different on average between the groups.32
The interaction term between domestic acquisition and unionization are in-
significant in all of the spell fixed effect estimates of Table 7, though the es-
timated coefficient is large and negative for the stayers. Due to the few ob-
served domestic ownership changes, and therefore a lack of statistical power, it
is not possible to draw conclusions about how the effect of domestic acquisi-
tions compares to foreign acquisitions in more unionized plants for the groups
of individuals we have considered here.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have considered how foreign acquisitions interact with union-
ization in determining workers’ outcome. Our proposed model shows one mech-
anism for endogenously generating a decrease in the bargaining outcome for the
union when the firm is acquired from abroad: The new multinational status of
the firm gives it a credible threat to move production abroad, thereby increasing
its outside option when bargaining with the union, which has a larger impact
when the union is relatively more powerful to begin with. This is in line with
previous theoretical models, which have arrived at similar conclusions based on
slightly different assumptions on how wages and employment are determined.
Utilizing detailed data on unionization and foreign ownership for firms and indi-
viduals in Norwegian manufacturing, we obtain results that are consistent with
a negative bargaining effect taking place.
In the large literature on effects of economic globalization on labor markets,
32Specifications where we divide the union measure into more finely defined groups seems
to indicate this, though we do not have the power to reject linearity due to the number of
acquisitions in our sample.
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there have been few studies trying to analyze directly how the wage effect of
foreign acquisitions may depend on workers’ ability to capture a larger share of
the rents in the firm. A challenge to such an analysis is the unobservable nature
of rents and bargaining power. We partly side-step some of these problems by
identifying situations where workers should be able to secure a bigger share of
rents, namely through the collective activity of a labor union that represents a
large share of workers in the plant. Our analysis provides evidence for a negative
wage effect of foreign acquisitions in firms where unions have a strong presence.
This suggests that there are changes in firms that become multinational, which
allows them to reduce the amount of the available surplus that goes to otherwise
powerful groups of workers. Since we do not find that foreign acquisitions change
union density at the plant level, we interpret our results as consistent with an
improvement in the outside option of the firm after foreign ownership change.
This mechanism could potentially be important not only in unionized firms and
sectors, but also in situations involving other groups of employees that enjoy a
strong position vis-a`-vis their employers. As is apparent from our model, the
employees will lose when they, in some sense, become less scarce to the firm,
compared to their overall scarcity in the economy, as measured by the outside
option of the employees.
The overall picture from both plant and individual wage regressions is consis-
tent with a negative association between wage changes after foreign acquisitions
and unionization. Taking a strong stand on the interpretation of the result is
difficult in light of the non-random nature of acquisitions. There are two possi-
ble broad explanations for this effect. The first is that foreign acquisitions are
selected on the effect we observe. Such an explanation implies that among the
plants with higher levels of unionization, the acquisition targets are the plants
where wages for reasons unrelated to the acquisition are going to decrease in
the future. This might be due to expected changes in the economic conditions
of the plants that both decrease wages and make them more attractive objects,
where such joint changes are more prevalent in firms that are typically more
unionized. As an example, consider an innovation in logistics planning, which
both reduces the need for high salaried logistics specialists, and increases the
scope of jointly managing operations between several facilities. The second ex-
planation for our results is that foreign acquisitions cause these effects. This is
consistent with a bargaining story, where workers are hurt due to multinational
firms having better outside options. It is also consistent with anecdotal evidence
of union resistance to foreign acquisitions. As an aside, this explanation would
imply that the scope for reducing worker rents is an incentive for acquisition
in itself, such that we would expect a higher number of foreign acquisitions to
take place among firms where workers have a high bargaining power, everything
else equal. Due to lack of plausible exogenous variation in foreign ownership, it
is not possible for us to separate the two broad explanations of our results, or
control for the potential selection implicit in the bargaining story. In our view,
this would be a highly interesting venue for future studies.
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